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ABSTRACT 
 
In United States v. Kramer, the Eighth Circuit upheld a 
two-level sentence enhancement for a defendant who made 
calls and sent text messages from a cellphone to a minor in 
order to lure her across state lines for criminal sexual 
activity. This enhancement was based on a provision in the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines that incorporates the 
definition of “computer” from the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act. The broad language of that statute encompasses 
not only computers—in the plainest sense—and cellphones, 
but also a myriad of other devices such as automobiles 
equipped with GPS navigation. In contrast to the 
sentencing context, this conception of many electronics 
devices as “computers” does not extend into issues related 
to searches. There, courts tend to permit broader 
examination of cellphones and other electronic devices in 
searches incident to arrest, despite the general protection 
computers are usually afforded under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent case, United States v. Kramer,1 the Eighth Circuit 
held that a two-level sentencing enhancement was appropriate 
when a defendant used a cellphone to induce a minor to cross state 
lines for criminal sexual activity. This enhancement applied 
because Kramer’s cellphone was deemed to qualify as a computer 
under the relevant statutory definition of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act.2 This definition is so encompassing that Steve 
Wozniak’s somewhat flippant claim, “[e]verything has a computer 
in it nowadays,”3 becomes a troubling reality for many criminal 
defendants. Given the realities of how this class of crimes is 
committed and the sweeping definition above, effectively all 
defendants sentenced for such crimes will be eligible for the 
sentence enhancement. In contrast, computers—as traditionally 
conceived—are offered unique protection from searches under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Under searches incident to arrest and those 
pursuant to a warrant, computer searches must be narrowly 
tailored. This double reading of the word “computer”—expansive 
for sentencing purposes and narrow for Fourth Amendment 
purposes—reflects the fog which plagues courts trying to apply 
1 631 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2011). 
2 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(1) (2006). 
3 Mark Millian, Apple's Steve Wozniak: 'We've lost a lot of control', CNN 
TECH (Dec. 8, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-08/ 
tech/steve.wozniak.computers_1_computer-whiz-computer-history-museum-
apple-shares?_s=PM:TECH. 
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traditional principles or older statutes to our rapidly evolving 
technology. 
 
I. THE WORD “COMPUTER” AND SENTENCING 
 
A common dictionary definition of “computer” is any “device 
that computes, especially a programmable electronic machine that 
performs high-speed mathematical or logical operations or that 
assembles, stores, correlates, or otherwise processes information.”4 
This definition encompasses essentially all portable electronics—
including iPods, smartphones, e-readers and iPads—as well as 
many microwaves and televisions. However, in common usage, 
“computer” generally intends either a laptop or desktop PC. 
Generally, most people think a computer is a device with a full 
QWERTY keyboard designed to be typed on at length.5 
Considering a more expansive definition than the intuitive one 
outlined above, the borders of where a modern device stops being a 
computer in any meaningful sense of the word is when a user 
cannot use the device to connect to the Internet. 
The United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) include an 
enhancement of two levels if the “offense involved the use of a 
computer . . . to (A) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate 
the travel of, the minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct; or 
(B) entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in 
prohibited sexual conduct with the minor.”6 The U.S. Sentencing 
4 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY. 
5 The increasing adoption of tablet devices, including the iPad and 
Microsoft Surface, shows some of the difficulty in defining “computer” in a way 
that is acceptable everyone. Some call these products halfway between a laptop 
and a smartphone. Michael Arrington, The Unauthorized TechCrunch iPad 
Review, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 2, 2010), http://techcrunch.com (calling the iPad a 
“New category of device”). Others deride them as oversized smartphones. 
Matthew Shaer, iPad nothing more than an oversized Apple iPhone: Motorola, 
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR: HORIZONS (Dec. 21, 2010), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Horizons. 
6 United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2G1.3 (b)(3) (2013). Similar 
enhancements—albeit not always with identical language—appear in USSG §§ 
2A3.1 (“Criminal Sexual Abuse” or Attempt), 2A3.2 (Statutory Rape or 
Attempt), 2A3.3 (“Criminal Sexual Abuse of a Ward” or Attempt), 2A3.4 
(“Abusive Sexual Contact” or Attempt), 2G2.1 (Creation of Child Pornography), 
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Guidelines incorporate the definition of “computer” in the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). “‘Computer’ has the 
meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).”7 In turn,  
the term ‘computer’ means an electronic, magnetic, 
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data 
processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or 
storage functions, and includes any data storage 
facility or communications facility directly related 
to or operating in conjunction with such device, but 
such term does not include an automated typewriter 
or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or 
other similar device.8 
A cellphone is not a typewriter, calculator, or similar device. 
The deciding factor in the CFAA analysis has to do with the 
storage capacity. Some typewriters have a one line memory and 
most four function calculators can remember a single number but 
beyond that they rely on the user to supply data and processing 
power. Even the most rudimentary cellphone available on the 
market today qualifies as a computer under the CFAA due to its 
ability to, at a minimum, store a call history and list of contacts. 
The Seventh Circuit adopted this reasoning and spoke in even 
broader terms, stating that “[e]very cell phone and cell tower is a 
‘computer’ under this statute's definition; so is every iPod, every 
wireless base station in the corner coffee shop, and many another 
gadget.”9 One commentator expands on the category of “many 
another gadget [sic]” which “can include coffeemakers, microwave 
ovens, watches, telephones, children's toys, MP3 players, 
refrigerators, heating and air-conditioning units, radios, alarm 
clocks, televisions, and DVD players, in addition to more 
traditional computers like laptops or desktop computers.”10 
2G2.2 (Trafficking in Child Pornography), 2G2.6 (“Child Exploitation 
Enterprises”), 2G3.1 (“Importing, Mailing, or Transporting Obscene Matter”), 
and 2H3.1 (“Interception of Communications”). 
7 United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2G1.3 (2012), Note 1, Definitions. 
8 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(1). 
9 U.S. v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005). 
10 Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1577-1578 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
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As a practical matter, there is a question of how some of the 
broader instances above could actually trigger the USSG 
computer-use enhancement. How, for example, could a 
coffeemaker be used to lure a child across state lines for immoral 
purposes? Some hypotheticals, however, are not so farfetched. One 
not addressed in any published case thus far would be the use of a 
modern automobile to transport a minor across state lines, absent 
the use of any other computer. The myriad of computerized 
controls, not to mention built-in GPS devices, inherent in a newer 
vehicle renders it a “computer” under the CFAA. As such, the 
individual who used such a car to transport a child across state 
lines for immoral purposes could be subject to the 2-level 
enhancement of USSG § 2G1.3 (b)(3) as was the defendant in 
Kramer. If an attempt were made by a U.S. Attorney to seek the 
enhancement, the intuitive understanding that cars and computers 
differ significantly, is likely to prevail, causing the enhancement to 
be denied. 
 
II. COMPUTERS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
There are two general streams of jurisprudence addressing 
searches: searches pursuant to a warrant and searches incident to 
arrest. The latter—searches performed in the context of an arrest—
generally offer far less protection for suspects than the former. In 
both situations, however, computers are treated very differently 
from cell phones and similar devices. 
 
A.  Warrant Searches 
 
The general rule governing searches is that a search of a 
person’s effects or papers requires a warrant.11 The Fourth 
Amendment requires that warrants are written “particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”12 This protection ensures that warrant searches are strictly 
limited to the scope of the warrant, even going so far to limit what 
11 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
12 Id. 
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sort of data the police can search for on a computer. 
Some courts attempt to resolve the limits of warrant computer 
searches by utilizing traditional ideas in Fourth Amendment law, 
especially the closed container doctrine, which prohibits 
warrantless searches of a closed container.13 
In applying these traditional ideas to computers, a prosecutor in 
the case U.S. v. Crist argued that a defendant’s entire computer 
should be treated as a single closed container. The Middle District 
of Pennsylvania did not accept the U.S. Attorney’s reasoning. “A 
hard drive is not analogous to an individual disk. Rather, a hard 
drive is comprised of many platters, or magnetic data storage units, 
mounted together. Each platter, as opposed to the hard drive in its 
entirety, is analogous to a single disk as discussed in Runyan.”14 
The court relied on the technical aspects of hard drive construction, 
which offered an avenue of limiting the search.  
With advents in data storage technology, however, this limit 
will do little good going forward. The storage on many newer 
computers, and on all cellphones, is flash-based rather than platter-
based.15 While similar reasoning may be applied—multiple chips 
in a flash hard drive and multiple platters in a traditional hard 
drive—some smaller devices, like cellphones, use flash chips for 
their storage. Crist’s reasoning could also protect, for example, a 
car’s GPS history information if the warrant is only written to 
permit searching the interior of the car for specific items or classes 
of items. For that matter, a warrant authorizing a search for any 
kind of item—that is, physical object—may not permit any search 
of the car’s computer systems or GPS history since digital data is 
not an object.16 
13 See generally U.S. v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2009). 
14 U.S. v. Crist, 627 F.Supp.2d 575, 586 (2008, M.D. Penn.) (citing U.S. v. 
Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
15 One example is Apple’s Macbook Air which, since 2010, is only 
available with flash hard drives. As time goes on, the list of potential examples 
of this kind of storage in laptops grows prodigiously. 
16 Courts addressing GPS data generally do so in the context of tracking 
units placed on cars by police officers. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct 
945 (2012). As such, courts have not addressed this information/object 
distinction directly but it could be leveraged by defendants seeking to exclude 
some information. 
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A better rubric under which to analyze warrant searches of 
computers is offered by U.S. v. Carey.17 In that case, an officer 
searching a computer came upon an image of child pornography. 
Instead of stopping for a modification of the warrant, the officer 
continued to search the computer for child pornography. “The 
warrant authorized the officer to search any file because ‘any file 
might well have contained information relating to drug crimes and 
the fact that some files might have appeared to have been graphics 
files would not necessarily preclude them from containing such 
information.’”18 When the search was challenged, the court found 
that the first incidence of child pornography was a licit find 
because it was in digital plain view, but the remainder resulted 
from the officer’s indifference to the warrant. “The Supreme Court 
has instructed, ‘the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a 
general exploratory search from one object to another until 
something incriminating at last emerges.’”19 Warrant searches must 
be limited not only to the places the warrant allows but also to the 
thing to be found. 
Despite the use of more traditional categories, including the 
plain view and closed container doctrines, some courts have 
attempted to extend general search protections over computers and 
other electronics. In United States v. Arnold, the district court held: 
[T]he information contained in a laptop and in 
electronic storage devices renders a search of their 
contents substantially more intrusive than a search 
of the contents of a lunchbox or other tangible 
object. A laptop and its storage devices have the 
potential to contain vast amounts of information. 
People keep all types of personal information on 
computers, including diaries, personal letters, 
medical information, photos and financial records.20 
17 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999). 
18 Id. at 1272. 
19 Id. at 1272 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 
(1971)). 
20 United States v. Arnold, 454 F.Supp.2d 999, 1003–1004 (C.D.Cal. 2006) 
reversed by U.S. v. Aronld, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008). The appeal was 
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The decision in Arnold shows that some judges are increasingly 
aware of the broad sweep permissive electronics searches would 
make into the private lives of individuals who may well have done 
nothing wrong.  
 
B.  Automobile Exception 
 
Despite the traditional protection against searches of closed 
containers, cell phones may be “opened” under the automobile 
exception.21 The jurisprudence addressing searches of cellphones is 
generally centered on phones found in automobiles, where 
longstanding rules permit their search despite the special protection 
generally afforded to computers. The limits of this exception are 
drawn by probable cause and “not defined by the nature of the 
container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, the 
exception is defined by the object of the search and the places in 
which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.”22 
This automobile exception is similar to the general exception to 
the privacy right that is triggered when an individual is arrested. 
[T]he police may also examine the contents of any 
containers found within the passenger compartment, 
for if the passenger compartment is within reach of 
the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within 
his reach. Such a container may, of course, be 
searched whether it is open or closed, since the 
justification for the search is not that the arrestee 
has no privacy interest in the container, but that the 
lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of 
any privacy interest the arrestee may have.23 
The application of this exception, however, treats cellphones and 
computers quite differently. While both have been shoehorned into 
the legal framework of the closed container doctrine, computers 
decided on the grounds that the search occurred at a border where warrantless 
searches are widely permitted. 
21 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
22 Id. at 824.  
23 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981) (footnotes omitted). 
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have been exempted from the automobile exception but cellphones 
have not. 
The Tenth Circuit has explicitly exempted computers from the 
automobile exception. In U.S. v. Burgess,24 the Court analyzed a 
search of a defendant’s motorhome, which revealed marijuana, 
cocaine, a laptop, and an external hard drive.25 In analyzing 
whether the discovery, and subsequent search, of the computer was 
licit, the court refused to follow the government’s simple 
“syllogism”: (1) the expected privacy of the contents of a computer 
is like that of a briefcase; (2) the automobile exception permits 
searches of briefcases, even if locked, found in automobiles given 
probable cause; hence (3) police may—given probable cause—
search computers found in automobiles.26 
The Burgess court did not disagree that the syllogism was 
formally valid, but clarified that the treatment of computers as 
closed containers was done “to emphasize the high expectation of 
privacy for” computers and “not to permit promiscuous searches 
under the automobile exception.”27 In dicta, the court emphasized 
that computers hold much information about an individual’s life, 
very little of which would be relevant for criminal investigation. 
Accordingly, a warrantless search of a computer would be like a 
warrantless search of “relevant documents so intermingled with 
irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted at the 
site.”28 While officers may seize such papers for evaluation 
pursuant to a search warrant granted by a magistrate when they 
cannot feasibly search them on site, “[t]he magistrate should then 
require officers to specify in a warrant which type of [documents] 
are sought.”29 Under similar reasoning, computers would be 
exempted from the automobile exception.30 
24 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009). 
25 Id. at 1082-83. 
26 Id. at 1088 citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) 
(confirming the applicability of the automobile exception to locked briefcases). 
27 U.S. v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoted in Burgess, 
576 F.3d at 1089). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 The Tenth Circuit ultimately punted on the issue, despite much 
discussion, because “[i]nteresting as the issue may be, we need not now resolve 
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Implicit in some courts’ dicta is the idea that computers are not 
subject to the automobile exception. For example the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri ruled, in an unpublished 
opinion, on a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress information 
found on his cellphone after it was discovered in an automobile 
search an officer conducted after the defendant’s arrest. “The Court 
concludes that the automobile exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement gave Officer Hilburn's [sic] 
latitude to search defendant's cell phone and camera, like it would 
allow the search of other closed containers in the vehicle.”31 This 
conclusion was followed immediately by a footnote distinguishing 
Kramer—on which the defendant relied—because it did not 
consider the Fourth Amendment implications of the 
computer/cellphone unification. 
This double standard has not gone unnoticed by Fourth 
Amendment scholars. “If current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
is extended to its logical conclusion, officers who arrest drivers for 
traffic infractions will be permitted to search the call histories, text 
messages, email, photos, movies, and Internet browsing history on 
iPhones with no suspicion of wrongdoing whatsoever.”32 In fact, 
the same line of reasoning would also permit the examination of 
the history of a GPS device found in, or built into, a car. Because 
this area of jurisprudence is currently growing and developing, it 
remains to be seen whether these concerns will come to fruition, 
but they certainly mark one possible trend of the unfolding 
interface of the Fourth Amendment and portable technology. 
 
C.  Searches Incident to Arrest 
 
Outside the context of automobiles, the permissibility of 
searches incident to arrest centers on the safety of officers. 
Because this standard is narrower than the automotive exception, it 
will be much less likely to cover the search of a cellphone, and its 
it because the search of Burgess' hard drives was authorized by a warrant.” 
Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1090. 
31 U.S. v. Stringer, 2011 WL 3847026, *9 (W.D. Missouri July 20, 2011). 
32 Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 27, 27 (2008). 
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bounds generally preclude a search of an arrestee’s cellphone’s 
memory. 
The Supreme Court has clearly delineated the reasons for 
warrantless searches incident to arrest. “The exception [to a 
general requirement for a warrant] derives from interests in officer 
safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in 
arrest situations.”33 The dangers in both categories are clear. A 
weapon in an arrestee’s control can harm the arresting officer, 
other officers, or other arrestees, and evidence left in an arrestee’s 
possession can easily be damaged or destroyed before recovered 
during booking. Neither category offers purchase for a warrantless 
search of either computers or cellphones conducted incident to 
arrest. 
Courts place extreme importance on the intent of the officer in 
searches incident to arrest. If the search was conducted for officer 
safety, the evidence will likely be permitted. In other 
circumstances, the Northern District of California struck down a 
search of defendants’ cellphones conducted subsequent to arrest 
because the “[o]fficers did not search the phones out of a concern 
for officer safety, or to prevent the concealment or destruction of 
evidence. Instead, the purpose was purely investigatory. Once the 
officers lawfully seized defendants' cellular phones, officers could 
have sought a warrant to search the contents of the cellular 
phones.”34 As a practical matter, it is unlikely that officer safety 
would ever justify a search of a cellphone’s memory. 
Similarly, cellphone memory is generally long-lasting and 
robust, thereby preserving evidence which does not offer sufficient 
reason to protect a warrantless search of an arrestee’s cellphone. In 
State v. Smith35, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected a search of a 
cellphone made subsequent to arrest on the grounds that the 
Government failed to show that any of its data faced imminent 
deletion or destruction and that it could not be found any other 
way.36 Much like the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Northern District 
33 Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). 
34 U.S. v. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, *8 (N.D. California May 23, 2007). 
35 920 N.E. 2d 949 (Ohio 2009) 
36 See THOMAS K. CLANEY, CYBER CRIME AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE: 
MATERIALS AND CASES 187 (2011). There are potential situations where 
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of California placed cellphones outside the reach of warrantless 
searches incident to arrest; “a cellular phone should not be 
characterized as an element of individual's clothing or person, but 
rather as a ‘possession[ ] within an arrestee's immediate control 
[that has] fourth amendment [sic] protection at the station 
house.’”37 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The word “computer” has a myriad of meanings depending on 
the context in which it is used. The choice of the meaning has a 
substantive effect on the legal framework applied to the object in 
question. In the sentencing context, for example, “computer” has 
the broad meaning under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
which can then result in the use of a simple cellphone rendering a 
defendant eligible for a sentencing enhancement. On the other 
hand, sometimes courts look past terminology to the functional 
aspects of the device in question, often traditional doctrines such as 
the closed container doctrine. Even in these contexts, however, 
some courts treat cellphones and computers much differently, 
typically to a defendant’s detriment. 
What devices can be searched, in what manner, and when are 
evolving areas of the law. One can only “speculate whether the 
Supreme Court would treat laptop computers, hard drives, flash 
drives or even cell phones as it has a briefcase or give those types 
of devices preferred status because of their unique ability to hold 
vast amounts of diverse personal information.”38 In the meantime, 
the mixed judicial reactions to the evidentiary implications of the 
word “computer” can offer advantage to both sides in criminal 
cases. 
evidence on a cellphone could be destroyed if not investigated at the time of 
arrest, they are not identifiable ex ante by an officer at the scene. One would be 
an iPhone that can be remotely wiped by someone with its associated iCloud 
account password. Determining whether such data will be deleted is impossible 
to tell before it begins. 
37 U.S. v. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, *8 (N.D. California May 23, 2007) 
(quoting U.S. v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
38 U.S. v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Prosecutors: Point to instances where courts have been 
widely permissive of searches of new technologies, 
especially cellphones. 
 Defenders: Point to the fact that a cellphone or other pieces 
of new technology often hold as much intimate information 
about an individual as a computer. They should, therefore, 
be extended the same protection. 
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